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Abstract
This article investigates the underlying causes for the persistency of the India–
Pakistan conflict and, on this basis, the chances and obstacles of the bilateral 
composite dialogue initiated in 2004. In particular, it wants to provide a theo-
retically grounded account of the factors that facilitated and constrained the 
bilateral composite dialogue process. Drawing on the regional security complex 
theory, this article examines the rivalry between the two South Asian nuclear 
powers on four levels of analysis: the domestic, the regional, the interregional 
and the global level. The analysis shows that there have been some substantial 
changes on all four levels in the recent decade or so and that these changes have 
provided more beneficial conditions for a peace process. These changes include, 
inter alia, India’s new regional policy, the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks for the region and India’s growing power capacities. However, major 
obstacles to the India–Pakistan dialogue and a permanent conflict  resolution 
continue to persist: the dominant role of the military in Pakistan, conflicting 
national identities and the still partially contested nature of statehood in India 
and Pakistan, which is in the case of Pakistan linked to the growing power of 
Islamic fundamentalists.
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Introduction
The relationship between India and Pakistan is fraught with mutual mistrust and 
antagonism and has been one of the most enduring and dangerous rivalries in 
contemporary world politics. The rivalry generated four wars, frequent skirmishes 
at the Line of Control (LOC), numerous crises with a high escalation potential and 
an arms race, which culminated in the nuclearization of both countries in 1998. 
After several failed attempts India and Pakistan, however, managed to establish a 
bilateral composite dialogue in January 2004. The dialogue initially led to consid-
erable rapprochement and raised hope for a permanent détente, but the optimism 
was soon dashed due to persistent Indo-Pak conflict. This article seeks to shed 
light on the causes of the persistency of Indo-Pakistan conflict and, on this basis, 
investigate the chances and obstacles of the bilateral composite dialogue. The 
questions that the article seeks to answer are: What has prevented a permanent 
détente and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan in the past? Against the 
backdrop of persistent Indo-Pak hostility, how can the initiation and achievements 
of the composite dialogue be explained? What are the further prospects of this 
dialogue process after its discontinuation in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist 
attacks of November 2008?
The theoretical framework for the analysis is the regional security complex 
theory (RSCT) devised by Buzan and Wæver (2003). A basic thesis of this article 
is that structural factors on the four levels of analysis—domestic, regional, inter-
regional and global—proposed by the theory have shaped the India–Pakistan con-
flict in a crucial way and that these factors have impeded a conflict resolution in 
the past. The RSCT is combined with insights of subaltern realism (Ayoob, 1995, 
2011) and liberal international relations (IR) theory (Moravcsik, 1997, 2010). The 
proposed analytical approach enables us to study not only how material and non-
material factors on different levels of analysis facilitate specific threat construc-
tions and contribute to their persistence, but also how changes can occur. 
The article provides a theoretically grounded study of the factors that have 
facilitated and constrained the bilateral composite dialogue process.1 It aims to 
show that the chances for a peace process have been enhanced by changes on all 
four levels of analysis. These changes include, inter alia, India’s new regional 
policy, the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attacks for the region and India’s 
growing power capacities. However, major obstacles to the India–Pakistan dia-
logue and a permanent conflict resolution continue to persist: the dominating role 
of the army in Pakistan, conflicting national identities and the still partially con-
tested nature of statehood in India and Pakistan. This article is divided into three 
parts. In the first section, the theoretical framework for the analysis is elaborated. 
The second section outlines the process of the India–Pakistan composite dialogue. 
In the third section, the evolution of the South Asian security complex is analyzed 
on the four different levels in order to identify the deeper causes for the persis-
tency of the conflict and the factors that have facilitated and constrained the bilat-
eral composite dialogue process. 
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Integrating Subaltern Realism and Liberal 
IR Theory into the RSCT
According to the RSCT, the regional level of security has become more auto-
nomous and thus important in international politics due to the process of decoloni-
zation and the end of the Cold War. ‘The central idea of RSCT is that, since most 
threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security inter-
dependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes’ 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 4). A region evolves on the basis of interlinkages in 
the field of security that are constituted by material and ideational factors. The 
 anarchy in the international system, geographical factors and the (regional) 
 balance of power are as important as the construction of security in the political 
process (securiti zation), that is, an act through which a concern is framed as a 
security issue. In this process, ideational factors, for example, historical narra-
tives, culture and identity, can play a crucial role (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 4/44). 
Accordingly, security threats and rivalries cannot simply be treated as given or 
natural outcomes of certain structural conditions, but as social constructions by 
political actors. Structure and agency are mutually constituted (Buzan & Wæver, 
2003, p. 70ff). The RSCT thus mediates, as Basrur (2006, p. 420) notes, ‘the gap 
between neorealism and constructivism by allowing both structure and securiti-
zation to determine the content of regional security’.
A regional security complex can be defined as ‘a set of units whose major 
 processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one 
another’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 44). This analysis is conducted on four levels 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 51):
1. Domestic level: stability of the state and domestic security threats;
2. Regional level: state-to-state relations within the region;
3. Interregional level: interaction with neighbouring region(s); and
4. Global level: role of super or great power in the region.
The different types of regional security complexes result from the interplay of 
these four levels. A regional security complex is transformed if its structure 
changes. These changes could occur on the domestic, regional, interregional or 
global level. For example, a structural transformation can emanate from regional 
integration processes that replace the state of anarchy, changes in power distri-
bution or an alteration of security perceptions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 53).
While the RSCT offers a multi-dimensional analytical framework that allows 
us to explore the interaction between material structures and ideational factors in 
the processes of securitization, the theory is partially deficient in two respects. 
First, the RSCT does not explicitly address the distinctive conditions and charac-
teristics of post-colonial states, namely the (incomplete) process of state forma-
tion and the high degree of internal conflicts that critically influence securitizations. 
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In this regard, subaltern realism (Ayoob, 1995, 2011) offers some valuable 
insights, because it highlights the context of state and nation building in the so-
called Third World—the imposition of the state model by external powers and the 
time span of both state formation and decolonization—and the resulting security 
predicaments of these states. Given disputed state boundaries, partially weak 
political institutions and a general lack of regime legitimacy, particularly in the 
early stages of state making, there are, for instance, strong incentives for regimes 
to exploit external diversions for gaining support and legitimacy. This is further 
exacerbated by the spatial and temporal proximity of post-colonial states and their 
state-building endeavours, often resulting, due to shared and disputed boundaries 
as well as overlapping populations, in conflicts (Ayoob, 2011, p. 178). 
A second deficiency of the RSCT is that it does not offer a sufficient frame-
work for studying the power structures and struggles within states that influence 
state preferences and the room for manoeuvre of political leaders. Here, the liberal 
IR theory is of use with its focus on how ‘[s]ocietal ideas, interests, and institu-
tions influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences, that is, the funda-
mental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments’ 
(Moravcsik, 1997, p. 513). Accordingly, a state’s domestic and foreign policies 
are determined by which of the many, and often conflicting, societal values and 
interests prevail in the political system. In other words, state preferences and 
behaviour are the result of domestic and transnational social pressures. While 
domestic social pressures derive from the formal and informal power distribution 
and struggles between societal actors, transnational social pressures result from 
the preferences and regime types of other states as well as the intensity of cross-
border interactions and interdependence in the international system (Doyle & 
Ikenberry, 1997, p. 12; Moravcsik, 2010, p. 236ff).
The India–Pakistan Composite Dialogue
The rapprochement between India and Pakistan began in April 2003, when the 
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Kashmir and made Pakistan a 
peace offering that was ultimately embraced by Pakistan’s President Pervez 
Musharraf. In contrast to previous talks, both sides deviated from their obstinate 
positions and took up talks on a broad range of issues such as confidence-building 
measures, disputed territories or the stimulation of bilateral trade. In the course of 
the bilateral composite dialogue, India and Pakistan achieved some progress in 
the following areas (Misra, 2007, p. 515f; Patil, 2008, p. 2f):
• A ceasefire significantly reduced military incidents along the LOC;
• Memorandum of understanding on confidence-building measures in the 
military sector (for example, establishment of a permanent telephone hot-
line between the foreign ministries, joint agreement on the notification of 
missile tests and demilitarization of disputed territories);
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• Memorandum of understanding on the threat of nuclear incidents and the 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
• Joint agreement on mechanisms and strategies for combating terrorism;  
• Reopening and expansion of train routes and bus services; and
• Resumption of bilateral trade, removal of non-trade barriers and establish-
ment of trade associations to promote bilateral trade.
The talks between India and Pakistan, however, moved slowly due to recurring 
differences of opinion: Pakistan temporarily returned to its demand that any nor-
malization of relations is dependent on the solution of the Kashmir dispute, 
whereas India held Pakistan’s support of militant groups responsible for the 
Kashmir problem. Nevertheless, both parties could achieve progress in the frame-
work of the dialogue, because Pakistan renounced its demand and did not con-
sider a referendum on the status of Kashmir under supervision of the United 
Nations as necessary any longer. In addition, Musharraf called on the militant 
groups in Kashmir to enter into a dialogue with India and stated that Pakistan, in 
principle, agrees on acknowledging the LOC as the final border, provided that 
Kashmir is jointly administered by India and Pakistan. Similarly, the Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh demonstrated his willingness to compromise when he 
declared that India could accept any solution with the exception of secession and 
both sides should attempt to make the border irrelevant. Finally, India and Pakistan 
repeatedly stressed that the peace process is irreversible (Ahmed, 2008; Betz, 
2007, p. 40).
Despite this progress, the dialogue process remained very fragile and was put 
to a test by terrorist attacks in India (e.g., attack on local trains in Mumbai in July 
2006) or on Indian institutions abroad (e.g., attack on Indian Embassy in 
Afghanistan in July 2008)2 (Misra, 2010, pp. 45–46) and by an increasing number 
of incidents at the LOC in recent times (Indian Express, 2013). As a result, the 
India–Pakistan dialogue was discontinued several times for a short period. When 
a civilian government came to power in Pakistan in spring 2008, it was expected 
that the dialogue would gain new momentum. By renouncing orthodox positions 
in Pakistan’s Indian policy, Pakistan’s new president Asif Zardari seemed to be 
willing to open a new chapter in bilateral relations. As the first Pakistani president 
to do so, Zardari not only declared that India has never been a threat for Pakistan 
but also labelled militant separatists in Kashmir as terrorists. In addition, he 
 proffered the possibility of abandoning Pakistan’s nuclear first-strike strategy 
(The Wall Street Journal, 2008). Zardari’s rapprochement initiative was, however, 
abruptly frustrated by the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008. 
After the terrorist attacks, carried out by the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba, 
New Delhi suspended the bilateral composite dialogue and blamed Pakistan 
for supporting and tolerating terrorist activities directed against India. Bilateral 
talks were eventually resumed in autumn 2011. While Pakistan accepted India’s 
longstanding demand to support the investigation of the terrorist attacks and 
cooperate with Indian authorities, India agreed on delinking terrorist attacks from 
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the  dialogue process in the future (Pandalai, 2011). However, India has not been 
willing to take up the bilateral composite dialogue with a more extensive agenda 
again due to Pakistan’s insufficient cooperation with regard to the persecutions 
of the Mumbai terrorists and an increasing number of incidents at the LOC in 
recent years.3
The Evolution of the South Asian Security Complex: 
Causes for the Persistency of the India–Pakistan 
Conflict and Prospects for a Peace Process
The South Asian security complex evolved from the India–Pakistan conflict and 
has since been dominated by this conflict. The violent partition of the Indian sub-
continent in 1947 transferred a domestic conflict motivated by religion and com-
munalism between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress party 
onto the international level and transformed it into a military–political conflict 
between an Islamic Pakistan and a secular, but Hindu-dominated, India. Against 
this background, the predominantly Muslim Kashmir, an independent princedom 
during the British Raj with a Hindu ruler, became the main point of contention 
between the two countries (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 101–102). 
In what follows, the continuities and changes in the key security dynamics 
between India and Pakistan are investigated on the domestic, regional, interre-
gional and global level. However, given the very limited scope of this article, the 
actual processes of securitization will not be traced and mapped in detail. Instead, 
the focus will be placed upon the general patterns and effects of securitizations, 
underlying factors that condition these choices and interlinkages between the dif-
ferent levels. Since this article simultaneously explores the persistency of India–
Pakistan conflict and the prospects for a peace process, it covers a broad time span 
and will thus necessarily focus on general patterns. Yet, given the changing actors 
and circumstances, an effort is made, where appropriate, to contextualize the 
arguments made.
The Domestic Level
India
India is a federal, secular, parliamentary democracy. Its unique ethnic, religious, 
lingual and socio-economic heterogeneity has been posing a major challenge 
since the state’s founding. Until today, the maintenance of the territorial integrity 
and political order are potentially threatened by secession movements and other 
militant groups, with Naxalism, Islamic fundamentalism and the insurgency in the 
northeast being identified as the major contemporary challenges to India’s inter-
nal security.4
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The Naxalites, whose ideological roots lie in Maoism and communism, strug-
gle to overthrow the existing political–economic order. Originally, a rather mod-
erate pro-peasant movement, the Naxalite insurgency, today affects around 
10 Indian states or provinces and was described by Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh (2006) as ‘the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our 
country’. The radical wing of the Naxalite movement, mainly represented by the 
Communist Party of India—Maoist (CPI-Maoist), wages a so-called people’s war 
against the Indian state. Operating predominantly in the rural and tribal areas of 
India’s eastern states such as Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the party and its guer-
rilla fighters and irregular combatants control small tracts of territory and regu-
larly carry out attacks against security forces, political opponents and public 
infrastructure. The Maoists maintain that they fight in the name of the poor, 
deprived and landless communities and in the absence of civil administration and 
police provide public goods in the affected areas through an alternative govern-
ance system. Given the militarization and expansion of the Maoist insurgency 
between 2005 and 2010, the Naxalite conflict became securitized and was increas-
ingly represented as a fundamental national security threat, whereas previously 
the conflict was seen more as a law-and-order problem resulting from a lack of 
development (Sundar, 2011, p. 53). 
Similarly, Islamic terrorism continues to rank very high on India’s national 
security agenda. With roughly 25 known Islamist terrorist groups operating in 
India today and about 6,000 fatalities between 2005 and 2012, India is among the 
countries most seriously affected by Islamist terrorism in the world. The main 
focus of these terrorist activities is the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir, but 
other parts of India have also been a target. In particular, the devastating and tacti-
cally sophisticated terrorist attacks in the Indian financial hub Mumbai in 
November 2008 underscored once more the danger of Islamist terrorism. Though 
there has been a decline in Islamic terrorism in recent years (Hussain, 2013, p. 3ff; 
SATP, 2013), it is still seen by Indian policy makers as a fundamental national 
security challenge, since Islamist terrorism is conceived as a direct threat to the 
Indian model of state and national unity (Cohen, 2013, pp. 64–65). Muslim terro-
rists aspire not only to enforce the disentanglement of Kashmir from the Indian 
Union but also to disrupt the Indian secular state model as a whole by provoking 
anti-Muslim sentiments in India and violent counteractions by Hindu-nationalist 
groups or state agencies against Muslims, thereby promoting further radicali-
zation of Muslims and Hindus and communal violence between both religious 
groups—and ideally further Islamization of South Asia in the long run. 
The third internal security challenge is militant separatism. While the Indian 
government has managed to ease conflicts with secessionists in the past by con-
ceding to them a higher degree of autonomy, there are still strivings for independ-
ence in some of India’s northeastern states, particularly in Assam, Manipur and 
Nagaland. India’s northeast, which is connected to the Indian heartland only by 
the narrow Siliguri corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh, is culturally and eth-
nically a very diverse region with around 200 tribal groups and recurrent clashes 
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along religious and ethnic lines. The Indian government has pursued a multi-
pronged strategy towards the northeastern region consisting of accommodation 
(peace and ceasefire talks, etc.) and counterinsurgency operations (Kumar, 2013, 
p. 164ff).
Though India has achieved a relatively high degree of political stability, the 
country’s nation-building process is still partially incomplete and its problems in 
managing the numerous cleavages within Indian society have been conducive to 
the India–Pakistan conflict. Having been worried about external attempts to desta-
bilize India and a potential strengthening of militant movements, Indian govern-
ments were generally less willing to compromise with regard to the Kashmir 
dispute. For any concession could be interpreted as a confession that India’s secu-
lar, state-nationalist system of government has failed (Saideman, 2005, p. 215), 
and reinforce these militant movements in their belief that the Indian state is vul-
nerable and can be coerced to ‘accept’ their demands for independence or, in the 
case of the Maoists and some Islamic fundamentalists, even be overthrown in the 
long run.
Given the fact that India is amongst the countries most seriously affected by 
internal violence and extremism in the world (Manoharan, 2013, p. 367), there is 
a profound awareness among Indian policy makers for the still existing challenges 
to manage the country’s unique internal diversity. Kashmir, the only predomi-
nantly Muslim state in India, is thus considered to be crucial to the legitimacy and 
integrity of India’s national identity and model of state. The rise in communalist 
violence (e.g., the pogrom-like riots in Gujarat in 2002) and the gain in power of 
Hindu nationalists have further reinforced these worries (Basrur, 2012, p. 20; 
Cohen, 2013, p. 58).
A crucial factor linking India’s internal security threats with the conflict with 
Pakistan is the incompatible national identities and state-building ideologies of 
both countries. India perceives Pakistan’s identity as a Muslim state on the basis 
of the two-nation theory as a direct threat to its secular and pluralist identity, 
which, in turn, challenges Pakistan’s national identity. From the Indian perspec-
tive, Pakistan cannot accept India’s secular, pluralist state model and the resulting 
claims to Kashmir, since it would jeopardize the political foundation and legiti-
macy of its own state model, and, therefore, attempts to disrupt and weaken India 
by supporting Islamic terrorist groups or separatist movements. This fear of exter-
nal powers ‘exploiting’ India’s internal diversity and cleavages can not only be 
attributed to the still partially contested nature of India’s state formation, but also 
to still influential Indian historical memories of the invasions of the Indian sub-
continent, which could, according to a prevalent Indian national narrative, suc-
ceed because these powers took advantage of India’s internal diversity and 
weakness (Bajpai, 1998, pp. 159–160).
For the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which emerged as the main antagonist to 
the Congress party in the 1990s and could successfully incorporate Hindu-
nationalist ideas into India’s political discourse, the conflict with Pakistan has in 
this respect another crucial dimension because it is framed in the context of the 
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‘Muslim’ invasion of the Hindu-dominated Indian subcontinent, which led to the 
oppression of the Hindu civilization, and is represented as a form of imperialism. 
The BJP regards the Indian subcontinent as a self-contained civilizational area, 
the Hindu civilization, which is not only understood as a religion but also as the 
subcontinent’s cultural foundation. Accordingly, the Pakistani state and its 
national identity are a relict of this invasion and challenge the ‘natural’ hegemony 
of Hinduism on the Indian subcontinent (Ogden, 2010; Singh, 2013b, p. 88ff).
Paradoxically, it was the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government, 
which initiated the bilateral composite dialogue with Pakistan. In spite of the 
BJP’s more belligerent and nationalistic rhetoric, Prime Minister Vajpayee pur-
sued a relatively pragmatic Pakistan policy, which was, amongst other factors, 
influenced by the new nuclear context of the conflict, India’s liberal economic 
policies, the constraints of large coalition governments (as a result of the high 
fragmentation of India’s party system) and the personal ambitions of Vajpayee 
to leave his mark on Indian foreign policy and segregate it from the Congress’ 
foreign policy (Chiriyankandath & Wyatt, 2005, p. 193ff; Pardesi & Oetken, 
2008, pp. 34–35). Crucially, the political opposition could hardly savage the more 
hawkish and nationalist BJP for being too soft on Pakistan and compromising 
India’s national interests. 
While Vajpayee’s peace initiative opened a new chapter in India–Pakistan rela-
tions, the real progress in the bilateral composite dialogue was achieved under the 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government.5 Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh, who has been a strong proponent of the peace initiative, saw India’s for-
eign policy largely through the prism of socio-economic development and thus 
regarded a stable neighbourhood, including a normalization of relations with 
Pakistan, as essential. While the bilateral composite dialogue was initially quite 
successful, the prime minister and other proponents of the peace process faced 
relatively strong domestic resistance, especially after the two terrorist attacks in 
2006 and 2008. On the one hand, forces within the government such as the home 
and the foreign ministries viewed the peace process rather sceptically. In addition, 
the prime minister lacked a strong power base within his own party, given Sonia 
Gandhi’s role as party leader and her rather ambivalent view on Pakistan. On the 
other hand, the growing power of the BJP in Indian politics and its more hawkish 
stance on Pakistan (especially when in opposition) also restricted the UPA gov-
ernment’s room for manoeuvre (Cohen, 2013, p. 63/74ff; ICG, 2012, p. 15/17; 
Times of India, 2014). 
Finally, terrorist attacks by Islamists led to repeated crises and generated new 
mistrust between India and Pakistan. Indian policy makers, following a strategy 
of diversion that uses external threats to distract from internal problems 
(Ganguly & Thompson, 2011, p. 15), started to regularly blame Pakistan for being 
involved in the attacks.6 Though Pakistan officially denied that it provides support 
to terrorists and insurgents, there was some evidence that certain elements within 
the Pakistani army and the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) actively 
supported or tolerated terrorist groups and regarded them as ‘strategic assets’ in 
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the fight against India (Jones, 2011, p. 82; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012, p. 111). 
Hence, terrorist attacks against India by groups based and trained in Pakistan 
could easily disrupt and jeopardize the peace process. This would be especially 
the case if Hindu nationalists in India decide to instrumentalize the attacks for 
their political interests. The successful combat of terrorism, particularly in the 
Indian part of Kashmir, is thus a crucial precondition for India to achieve sustain-
able peace with Pakistan. India, however, can only tackle Islamic fundamentalism 
and its other domestic security threats successfully, if it addresses the socio- 
economic and political causes of these conflicts such as injustice, discrimination 
and marginalization.   
Pakistan 
Pakistan has a hybrid system of government that oscillates between patrimonal-
ism, semi-authoritarianism and semi-democracy. This uneasy mix of military 
autocracy and aspiring democracy, in which the military uses populism and 
democracy to legitimate its rule, while the civilians largely depend on the armed 
forces to stay in power, has remained relatively constant since Pakistan’s found-
ing and has produced alternating periods of more civilian and more military rule 
(Basrur, 2012, pp. 21–22; Cohen, 2013, p. 102; Qazi, 2013, p. 6). Pakistan’s 
national identity is shaped by the idea that Hindus and Muslims cannot live 
together peacefully in a Hindu-dominated state. As a result, it rejects India’s secu-
lar, pluralist model of state and perceived itself as the unitary state for all Muslims 
on the subcontinent (Nasr, 2005, p. 179/192; Pande, 2011).7 
While India’s state-building process has been relatively successful, Pakistan’s 
state-building process is severely threatened by ethnic, religious and political 
cleavages. These cleavages run between conservative religious forces, who aspire 
a re-Islamization of society or an Islamic theocracy, and secular liberal circles, 
between the Punjabi majority and ethnic minorities such as the Balochs, and 
between a military-authoritarian and civil-democratic state governance. Crucially, 
there are also conflicting identity concepts about the Pakistani nation itself 
(Cohen, 2011a, p. 22; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012, pp. 116–117; Yasmeen, 2013, 
pp. 159–160).
Since the state’s founding there have been four military coups in Pakistan 
(1958, 1969, 1977, 1999), numerous constitutional crises and five intrastate wars 
(1971, 1973–1977, 1986–2002, 2005–2008, since 2007). In spite of a comparably 
high level of political institutionalization, Pakistan has been unable to expand its 
monopoly on the use of force to the tribal areas in the northwest and to the prov-
ince of Balochistan and to settle its various domestic cleavages and problems 
through these institutions (AKUF, 2013; Ganguly & Fair, 2013, pp. 122–124; 
Hewitt, 2010, p. 405). The army, which traditionally plays a key role in Pakistani 
politics, managed to further expand its power in the Musharraf era and emerged 
as a state within the state (cf. Haqqani, 2005; Lieven, 2011; Mazhar, 2008; Nawaz, 
2009; Paul, 2014) holding a disproportionate amount of political power and exer-
cising de facto veto power over foreign, security and economic policies. Due to 
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the increasing instability of state and society, there is growing concern within 
Pakistan and abroad that the country is on the verge of becoming a failing state 
and Islamic fundamentalists could seize power (see Cohen et al., 2011; Gul, 2011; 
Lodhi, 2011; Rashid, 2013). 
Given Pakistan’s incomplete and contested state-building process, the conflict 
with India has served until today as one of the most important identity-generating 
ties within Pakistani society. The different governments, particularly the military 
governments, have regularly exploited the conflict for political interests. In par-
ticular, the army uses the conflict with India to justify its dominant role within the 
state. This obsession with India and Kashmir can also be attributed to the fact that 
India’s secular model of state, in particular the inclusion of a predominantly 
Muslim community in the Indian Union, poses a direct threat to Pakistan’s (frag-
ile) national identity (Cohen, 2013, p. 11/89; Fair, 2011, p. 91; Lieven, 2011, 
p. 185ff). As in the case of India, the conflict thus serves at the core a crucial 
purpose of domestic politics since it ‘defends’ the (still contested) statehood and 
can be used by political actors to gain support for or distract from internal prob-
lems. This crucial linkage between internal and external factors conditions the 
high level of securitization. 
Similarly, the bilateral composite dialogue has been impeded by the differ-
ences between democratic and hybrid regime types. Given the dominant role of 
the army in foreign and defence policy making, Pakistani regimes have been rela-
tively war prone and have tended to see relations with India through a very 
restricted hyperrealist and militarist prism (Paul, 2014, p. 5/73; Tremblay & 
Schofield, 2005, pp. 225–229). As a result, most escalations were caused by 
Pakistan; for instance, Pakistan tried to take advantage of India’s supposed weak-
ness after the border war with China in 1962 and to destabilize India by support-
ing terrorists and insurgents. At the same time, Indian policy makers, as in most 
democratic states (see Geis et al., 2006), have often tended to perceive a non-
democratic and religious Pakistan as inherently backward, aggressive, instable or 
illegitimate and therefore have been generally more inclined to resort to a more 
aggressive foreign policy themselves. Accordingly, India, in a combination of 
mistrust and a sense of superiority, has contributed to escalation processes (e.g., 
through risky and provocative war games) and seized opportunities to weaken 
Pakistan (e.g., by supporting the Bengali liberation movement), thereby fuelling 
further mistrust and fear in Pakistan (Cohen, 2013, p. 64/94).
Escalating domestic political instability and the growing power of Islamic fun-
damentalists—for example, the takeover of the Swat valley by the Pakistani 
Taliban in 2007, almost 15,000 civilian victims of Islamist violence in the last five 
years, encounters in the financial hub Karachi and the growing number of terrorist 
attacks against state institutions—increasingly overshadow Pakistan’s conflict 
with India, and Islamabad has been more preoccupied with tackling domestic 
unrest in recent years. Ironically, this development may prove to be conducive for 
the re-start of the bilateral composite dialogue. There is now a growing awareness 
within Pakistan, including the military, that Islamic extremism poses a  fundamental 
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threat to the country, and that this threat is also partially responsible for the socio-
economic crisis, which in turn could be diminished through better (economic) 
relations with India (Cohen, 2013, pp. 93–94; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012, p. 134; 
Rashid, 2010, p. 378). Pakistan’s former Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez 
Kayani, acknowledged in his Independence Day speech in 2012 that Islamist 
funda mentalism poses a severe threat to Pakistan and concluded: ‘The war against 
extremism and terrorism is not only the Army’s war, but that of the whole nation’ 
(ISPR, 2012). Pakistan’s civilian leaders too have little interest in jeopardizing the 
peace process with India, when the army has demonstrated its willingness to 
 combat Islamist insurgents and terrorists (e.g., recapturing of the Swat valley in 
2009) (Mullick, 2012, pp. 93–94; Siddiqa, 2011, p. 15). 
However, the Pakistani army has so far concentrated its counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism operations on those groups that directly threaten Pakistan’s state 
institutions (such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), but omitted groups that pri-
marily carry out terrorist attacks in India and Afghanistan (such as the Jamaat-ud-
Dawa). This suggests that the army and parts of the civilian political elite still see 
some of these Islamist groups as ‘strategic assets’ in the fight against India and 
Afghanistan, and do not want to confront them for fear that these groups may turn 
against the Pakistani state (Fair, 2011, p. 100; Lieven, 2011, pp. 191–192). The 
support and use of Islamist militancy has been a key component of Pakistan’s 
domestic and foreign polices since the state’s founding. Pakistan’s army has not 
only provided these groups substantial financial, logistical and military assis-
tance, but also protected them from law enforcement. Though Pakistan had some 
success with this strategy in the past, in recent years it has begun to suffer the 
consequences of losing control over some of these militant groups, many of which 
now attack state institutions (Haqqani, 2005, pp. 2–3; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012, 
p. 113/128ff). 
The growing power of Islamist fundamentalism in Pakistani society (including 
creeping Islamization within the army) (cf. Fair, 2014; Ullah, 2014, pp. 22–27) 
and the dominant role of the armed forces within the state have critically influ-
enced the evolvement of the bilateral composite dialogue. While Islamist  militants 
could jeopardize the dialogue process through terrorist attacks and raised the 
stakes for any Pakistani government to compromise with India on Kashmir, 
the army, which remains largely convinced that India will only compromise if the 
threat of Islamist militancy remains present, has never fully embraced the bilateral 
composite dialogue and thus repeatedly interfered into it. So it was General Pervez 
Musharraf who sabotaged the first attempt to initiate the dialogue process through 
a covert operation in Kashmir that led to the Kargil war in 1999. However, after 
his coup d’état, Musharraf advanced the bilateral composite dialogue and a poten-
tial solution of the Kashmir dispute through secret back-channel meetings. Apart 
from the impact of regional, interregional and global developments on Pakistani 
politics, which will be discussed in the following sections, Musharraf’s shift of 
Pakistan’s India policy can be attributed to two main factors: first, Pakistan’s risky 
military and covert operations, as the Kargil war demonstrated, did not yield 
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the desired success and increased the danger of a nuclear escalation; second, 
 having survived several assassination attempts by Muslim extremists, Musharraf 
realized the increasing danger of Islamist militancy for Pakistan’s national  security 
(Coll, 2009).
After its initial successes, however, the bilateral composite dialogue was 
impeded by developments in Pakistan’s domestic politics. While large parts of the 
Pakistani army viewed the dialogue process suspiciously and did not support the 
envisioned mechanism to settle the Kashmir dispute, Musharraf’s increasingly 
authoritarian rule (e.g., declaration of a state of emergency and the unconstitu-
tional ouster of a popular Supreme Court judge) and the deteriorating internal 
security situation (e.g., occupation of the Red Mosque by Islamist militants) 
resulted in growing popular discontent and protests, which ultimately forced 
Musharraf to re-establish civilian rule. The Pakistan People’s Party, which came 
to power after the elections in 2008, was highly supportive of the bilateral com-
posite dialogue; however, the army’s repeated interference in foreign policy 
 decision-making (e.g., President Zardari had to withdraw the offer of an agree-
ment on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons after General Kayani, the then Chief 
of Army Staff, rebuked him for this initiative) and the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 
2008 led to the disruption of the bilateral composite dialogue. The army then 
thwarted Zardari’s intention to properly investigate the Mumbai terrorist attacks 
at the request of the Indian government. 
The consolidation of Pakistan’s democracy—with the first democratically 
elected government to serve an entire term followed by relatively free national 
elections in May 2013 and a smooth transfer of power—could offer an opportu-
nity for restructuring the power relations between civilian parties and the military 
and for strengthening the dialogue process with India. Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif, whose Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) secured a large parliamentary 
majority in the 2013 national elections, declared that his government will accord 
normalization of relations with India on a high priority and further expand the 
dialogue process, stirring hopes that Sharif might manage to bring the Indian 
 policy more under the control of the civilian government and implement such 
a policy change (Business Standard, 2013; Mohan, 2013).8 To achieve this objec-
tive, Sharif must perform a delicate balancing act of containing and accommo-
dating Islamist militants and the army. 
The Regional Level
At the regional level, several factors have facilitated India–Pakistan conflict and 
prevented conflict resolution in the past. A crucial factor for the conflict’s persis-
tence is India’s dominance in South Asia. India has almost 10 times as many 
inhabitants as Pakistan and thus makes up about 75 per cent of South Asia’s total 
population. India’s gross national product accounts for more than 80 per cent of 
the region’s economic output and its armed forces are almost four times bigger 
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than Pakistan’s armed forces. This Indian preponderance has inevitably led to 
fears of dominance among India’s smaller neighbours and, in the case of Pakistan, 
to direct resistance. The fear of Indian dominance was driven further by India’s 
proclamation of a regional security doctrine; by this doctrine, India claimed for 
itself a hegemonic role in South Asia, pointedly warned external powers to stay 
out of regional politics, and asserted its right to intervene in domestic politics 
and foreign policy of neighbouring states if such intervention was required to 
bolster Indian security. The influence of the Indian doctrine of regional security 
was  manifested in several areas: for instance, India intervened in the civil war 
in Sri Lanka, annexed Sikkim into the Indian Union, and largely exercised veto 
 powers over Nepal and Bhutan’s foreign policy (Cohen, 2001, pp. 136–137; 
Malone, 2012, p. 50/105). 
India’s fear of external interference in South Asia stems from powerful histori-
cal memories of invasions of the Indian subcontinent. According to a prevalent 
Indian national narrative, these invasions underscore the geopolitical importance 
of South Asia making it prone to external intrusion (Bajpai, 1998, pp. 159–160). 
The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 further ‘installed an inherent distrust of 
outside forces that had formed the new borders of India and Pakistan, an action 
seemingly undertaken to inspire instability in the region by failing to synchronize 
with ethnic and state borders’ (Ogden, 2011, p. 5). To respond to this threat of exter-
nal interference, India essentially continued the strategic behaviour of the British in 
the Indian subcontinent, which placed an emphasis on regional hege mony and a 
system of ‘buffer’ states for preventing invasions (Pant, 2011a, pp. 15–16). 
India, however, did not establish a regional order in which the hegemon pro-
vides certain public goods and, in return, bears the higher costs or provides other 
incentives for regional followership such as concessions and power sharing in the 
framework of a regional organization. The region’s different political systems, 
economic development paths and religious and ethnical cleavages impeded the 
adoption of such a cooperative-integrative policy approach. It was not until the 
1980s that there was an attempt to form a regional organization, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (see Muni, 2010; Sáez, 2011). 
Due to the persistence of India–Pakistan conflict, however, the SAARC hardly 
brought about regional cooperation and integration. Regional economic integra-
tion, for example, by dismantling trade barriers, would have encouraged rap-
prochement, cooperation and convergence of interests among South Asia’s states. 
But India and Pakistan were unwilling to tread this path. The power political 
dimension of the conflict—India’s great power aspirations and Pakistan’s unwill-
ingness to accept the claim for hegemony by its bigger neighbour—also prevented 
both sides from cooperating in the field of security policy that could have contri-
buted to regional stability and peace.
It was only after India started to liberalize its economy in the early 1990s that 
it developed a greater interest in the economic integration of South Asia. Since 
then, Indian governments have gradually placed a greater emphasis on  cooperation, 
multilateralism, concessions and attractiveness instead of classical machtpolitik 
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in dealing with India’s neighbours in South Asia (see Mohan, 2006; Raghavan, 
2013; Saran, 2005; Wagner, 2005). This change in India’s regional policy, embraced 
by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in particular, also provided the context for the 
bilateral composite dialogue by generating greater incentives for South Asian 
countries to cooperate with India and accept its leadership role, and by obliging India 
to abstain from using coercive means or paternalistic policies in the pursuit of its 
regional interests. In line with this policy change, India not only made greater con-
cessions towards its neighbours, but also championed the revitalization of SAARC. 
For example, on India’s initiative, a free trade agreement was concluded in 2006. In 
terms of dismantling trade barriers, India also made concessions to its neighbours. In 
addition, Pakistan indicated that it would finally grant India the most favoured nation 
(MFN) status. According to estimates by the World Bank, due to the impact of these 
measures, bilateral trade between India and Pakistan was expected to increase from 
US$2.7 billion in 2011 to US$9 billion in 2014 (Times of India, 2013; Wagner, 2012, 
pp. 2–3). The improvement in bilateral economic relations between India and 
Pakistan could strengthen the role of economic stakeholders in the foreign policy 
decision-making process. The enhancement of intra-regional trade could also lead, 
for the first time in the post-colonial era, to positive interdependence among the 
South Asian countries, particularly between India and Pakistan.
The India–Pakistan relationship was characterized by a power imbalance in the 
past. This power imbalance is likely to increase in the next decades due to India’s 
relatively high economic growth rates and Pakistan’s persistent domestic crisis. 
The further expansion of India’s power would suggest a transformation in the 
South Asian security complex from bipolarity to unipolarity. Provided that India 
continues to adhere to and further broaden its cooperative-integrative regional 
policy, this Indian dominance could compel Pakistan to come to terms with India’s 
hegemonic role in the region instead of attempting to match India’s preponder-
ance with foreign alliances and an offensive nuclear strategy.9 Maintaining the 
regional balance of power, by contrast, has hardly contributed to stability, as 
the Kargil war and the crisis of 2001/02 demonstrated. 
The Interregional Level
At the interregional level, the external influence of regional great power China on 
the South Asian security complex is of particular importance. On the one hand, 
India and Pakistan’s interactions with China have affected the evolvement of the 
India–Pakistan conflict and the bilateral composite dialogue. On the other hand, 
the simultaneous rise of China and India, which is linked to growing engagement 
of and increasing rivalry between both countries in Asia, is gradually leading to 
the emergence of an Asian super-complex. 
Relations between India and China have been tense since the late 1950s, 
mainly as a result of an unresolved border conflict and their mutual great power 
ambitions. The border conflict led to war in 1962 and India suffered a defeat. 
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After the war, China formed an alliance with Pakistan and supported its military 
build-up, including the country’s nuclear and missile programme. By building up 
a counterweight, the Chinese leadership tried to contain India’s regional and 
global aspirations. Moreover, China interfered in the wars between India and 
Pakistan, and in the Kashmir issue (Chandy, 2000, p. 305; Kapur, 2005, p. 148/151; 
Malik, 2003, p. 36). 
The political and military support Pakistan received from China and the United 
States10 has contributed to the maintenance of the India–Pakistan conflict by com-
pensating Pakistan’s inferiority vis-à-vis India. At the same time, the tense rela-
tions with China played a crucial role in India’s military modernization and 
nuclear programme launched in the 1960s. The Indian leadership also justified 
India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998 on the basis of the security threat posed by 
China to India (Cohen, 2001, p. 179). The China factor then has impeded a rap-
prochement between India and Pakistan and contributed to the arms race in South 
Asia. Islamabad fears that India’s military build-up is directed against Pakistan. 
India, however, worries about a deepening of the China–Pakistan alliance that 
would help Pakistan to maintain the regional balance of power and could mean a 
two-front war in case of a crisis.  
India–China relations have significantly improved in recent years. The Chinese 
attitude towards India has changed due to India’s economic rise, its nuclear weap-
ons and the substantial changes in the United States’ South Asia policy. The foun-
dation for this rapprochement was laid in the 1990s, when India and China agreed 
to undertake confidence-building measures with regard to the border conflict in 
order to prevent incidents and mutual provocations. Although the border conflict 
has not been resolved yet, India and China have, however, established an institu-
tionalized dialogue process regarding the border. In addition, China has moved 
away from interfering or taking sides in the India–Pakistan conflict. For instance, 
Beijing now considers the Kashmir conflict as a bilateral problem of India and 
Pakistan. The India–China strategic partnership formed in 2005 was also an 
important next step in institutionalizing and broadening the cooperation between 
the two countries (Garver, 1996, pp. 337–343; Mohan, 2004, p. 144; Yuan, 2007, 
p. 134). By this move, China acknowledged India’s new role in world politics and 
attempted, with a more cooperative policy, to prevent India from forming close 
ties with the United States. Beijing suspects that the United States wants to esta-
blish India as a counterweight to China. Hence, the Chinese leadership wants to 
avoid provoking India unnecessarily by its Pakistan policy.
Despite these developments, China and India are likely to remain strategic 
competitors rather than real partners (cf. Mohan, 2012; Pant, 2012; Scott, 2008). 
China’s development of ports and other strategically sensitive infrastructure pro-
jects in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is an indicator of this 
strategic competition. Given that Indian policy makers and the military see South 
Asia and the IOR as India’s natural sphere of influence,11 they are very suspicious 
of China’s activities and perceive them as an attempt to ‘strategically encircle 
India’ (Ministry of Defence, 2004). 
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For China, its past interference in the India–Pakistan conflict had been an 
effective instrument to restrict India’s political and strategic ambitions in South 
Asia and to prevent the Indian military from concentrating troops along the Sino-
Indian border. As a result, in the past, China was not interested in conflict resolu-
tion or rapprochement between India and Pakistan. The rapprochement between 
India and China has, however, provided a window of opportunity for the Indo-Pak 
bilateral composite dialogue. While India will be less concerned about Chinese 
interference in the India–Pakistan conflict, Pakistan’s strategy to entangle China 
into the conflict (particularly, in times of an escalation) will largely fail. The 
Chinese leadership’s criticism of Pakistan for provoking escalations with India 
reflects Beijing’s worry about Islamist militancy in Pakistan and its potential 
repercussions for China’s national security (Curtis, 2012, p. 257). This restricts 
Pakistan’s room for manoeuvre towards India, which may facilitate the dialogue 
process by convincing Pakistani leaders of the limited prospects of a military 
conflict. Though China will continue to maintain the possibility of playing the 
Pakistan card in case its relations with India worsen, the Chinese leadership will, 
due to India’s growing weight in world politics, refrain from such a move as long 
as Beijing believes that it is possible to transform its strategic competition with 
India, at least partially, into a positive-sum game. This in turn also increases the 
prospects of the peace process between India and Pakistan. 
The Global Level
Though the cold war had no determining impact on the Indo-Pak conflict due to 
the strong domestic and regional components of the South Asian security complex 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 105), the role of the United States and the Soviet 
Union should not be underestimated. During the Cold War, the United States built 
Pakistan up as a regional ally to counterbalance Iranian nationalism after the fall 
of the Shah, to contain Soviet influence in the region, and to constrain India’s 
global ambitions and its non-alignment policy, which Washington regarded as a 
threat to US geostrategic interests. Hence, the United States had no real interest in 
a conflict resolution, but concentrated its diplomatic efforts only on preventing an 
escalation (Kapur, 2005, pp. 132–133). Moreover, as Paul (2014) has argued, the 
extensive economic and military aid that Pakistan received from the United States 
led to a ‘geostrategic curse’ in the sense that it discouraged the Pakistani elites from 
initiating urgent economic and social reforms for generating sustainable growth 
and development and stabilized the power of the military as well as the landed 
aristocracy. This contributed to the persistence of hybrid regime types in Pakistan 
and the veto power of the army, which in turn impeded peace with India. 
From the Indian perspective, potential US diplomatic interference in the Kashmir 
dispute and Washington’s support to Pakistan not only posed a national security 
threat but also thwarted India’s ambition to become a great power (e.g., sanctions 
against India after the first nuclear test). In the aftermath of the  rapprochement 
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between China and the United States in the early 1970s initiated by the Nixon 
administration, India was confronted with a potential United States–Pakistan–China 
alliance, which compelled New Delhi to form a strategic partnership with the Soviet 
Union. For the Soviet Union, India’s non-aligned stance and geostrategic location 
made it an important ally for containing US influence in South Asia and for building 
up a counterweight to China (Mahapatra, 2004, pp. 131–132).
The Soviet Union provided India with the latest weapon systems and aided the 
build-up and modernization of the Indian Navy. It prevented the UN Security 
Council from adopting anti-India resolutions, ensured uninterrupted energy sup-
plies to India and provided an important export market for the Indian economy 
(Jain & Nair, 2000, p. 68f). Given the fact that both superpowers saw the India–
Pakistan conflict through a geostrategic prism, they were not interested in making 
the resolution of the conflict a priority. To do so would have meant removing India 
and Pakistan’s dependence on the superpowers and altering the balance of power 
in South Asia, thus providing India with more room to manoeuvre in pursuit of its 
global ambitions. This situation hardly changed until the end of the cold war. In 
fact, the region gained strategic importance again after the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in 1979 and Pakistan became a highly valued partner and frontline 
ally of the United States again.
Operating within a unipolar world order and a globalized world economy in the 
post-cold war era, and affected particularly by a balance of payment crisis in the 
early 1990s, India began to liberalize its economy and actively tried to improve rela-
tions with the United States. These developments also had a positive impact for the 
bilateral composite dialogue. While economic liberalization in the 1990s stimulated 
a change in India’s regional policy, the rapprochement between India and the United 
States changed the regional balance of power in India’s favour. Relations between 
the two countries improved very quickly and even India’s nuclear tests in 1998 
posed no serious problem for this rapprochement process. The United States began 
to take a pro-India position on many issues (e.g., the Kashmir dispute), while United 
States–Pakistan relations started to cool down. In March 2000, India and the United 
States formed a strategic partnership (Gould, 2010, p. 97ff). Within the framework 
of this strategic partnership, both sides concluded several defence deals and signed 
a nuclear agreement, through which the United States recognized India as a legiti-
mate nuclear weapons power even though India is not a signatory to the nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (see Ganguly et al., 2006; Pant, 2011b; Samuel, 2007).
Though Pakistan has remained an important regional partner in the ‘War on 
Terror’, the United States now has better relations with India and holds a far more 
critical view of Pakistan (Mohan, 2008, p. 145; Riedel, 2013, p. 177/201). Like 
India, the majority of United States policy makers see Pakistan as a fragile nuclear 
state that is a safe haven and recruitment and training base for terrorists and whose 
military supports and tolerates Islamist insurgents and terrorists and uses them as 
instruments of state policy (see Cohen et al., 2011; Fair, 2012; Khalilzad, 2012; 
Markey, 2013; Riedel, 2013; Schmidt, 2011). In recent years, the United States 
even carried out aerial attacks against suspected terrorist and insurgent camps on 
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the Pakistan side of the Pak-Afghanistan border, thus infringing upon Pakistan’s 
sovereignty. Although Islamabad publicly criticized the United States for the 
infringing upon its sovereignty, it was evident to many that the Pakistani army, at 
least partially, supported the US drone attacks on the insurgents in the tribal areas 
(Ahmad, 2010, p. 203; Jones, 2011, p. 87). It must also not be forgotten that in 
May 2011, a US Navy SEAL team carried out a commando raid deep within 
Pakistan from its base in Afghanistan in order to capture the world’s most notori-
ous terrorist, Osama bin Laden, who was hiding in the garrison town of Abbottabad. 
The commando operation, launched without any prior warning to the Pakistani 
authorities, was a resounding success. The Navy SEALs captured and killed bin 
Laden and took away his body to their base from where it was eventually buried 
in secret at sea. Several US policy makers publicly suggested that they believed 
that bin Laden would not have been able to hide for so long without support 
from some influential elements within the Pakistani establishment, particularly 
the military and the ISI (Fair, 2012, p. 244; Riedel, 2013, p. 201). Summarizing the 
prevalent view on India and Pakistan in the United States, Wright (2011) noted:
India has become the state that we tried to create in Pakistan. It is a rising economic 
star, militarily powerful and democratic, and it shares American interests. Pakistan, 
however, is one of the most anti-American countries in the world, and a covert sponsor 
of terrorism. Politically and economically, it verges on being a failed state. And, despite 
Pakistani avowals to the contrary, America’s worst enemy, Osama bin Laden, had been 
hiding there for years—in strikingly comfortable circumstances—before US comman-
dos finally tracked him down and killed him.
Thus, the United States has come to regard Pakistan more as a problem or even 
a foe rather than an ally (Cohen, 2011b; Riedel, 2011). This has led to calls in the 
US Congress to restrict assistance programmes to Pakistan (e.g., Kerry–Lugar 
Act) and to recalibrate the United States’ Pakistan policy (cf. Khalilzad, 2012; 
Markey, 2013; Riedel, 2013). Pakistan’s external support, a crucial variable for 
balancing its power disparity vis-à-vis India, has thus become extremely fragile. 
This development may act as an important incentive for the India–Pakistan 
peace process and facilitate the resumption of the stalled bilateral composite dia-
logue. Pakistan’s bargaining position has weakened considerably and it is under 
international pressure to take action against terrorist groups and networks operat-
ing from its territory. Since Western governments see these groups and networks 
as a major threat (Jones, 2011, p. 70; Thakur, 2011, p. 205), it is dangerous for 
Pakistan to use them as strategic assets in the conflicts with neighbouring states 
such as India and Afghanistan. To continue to do so may lead to greater military 
strikes in violation of its sovereignty and even international isolation. Moreover, 
by continuing on the path of conflict, Pakistan today can hardly hope to interna-
tionalize the Kashmir dispute and accuse India of state terrorism. Furthermore, 
any decline in Pakistan’s external military assistance would enable Pakistani elites 
to undertake necessary economic and social reforms and facilitate the  further 
 consolidation of Pakistan’s democracy, which in turn would benefit the peace 
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 process with India. On its part, New Delhi now has to worry less about external 
powers taking advantage of the Indo-Pak conflict in order to weaken and contain 
India. This may actually spur India’s political elites to push ahead with a cooperative 
regional policy and to settle the conflict with Pakistan through a dialogue process.  
Conclusion 
This article investigated the causes of the persistency of the India–Pakistan con-
flict in order to highlight those factors that have facilitated the bilateral dialogue 
process as well as to assess the prospects of the India–Pakistan peace process. The 
analysis was grounded by RSCT, subaltern realism and liberal IR theory. While 
the RSCT offers a multi-level approach towards regional security issues that 
allows for the consistent integration of structure and agency, subaltern realism 
highlights the distinctive conditions of post-colonial states such as the incomplete 
state-building processes or the interplay of internal and external security threats, 
and liberal IR theory sheds light on how state preferences derive from domestic 
(e.g., constitutional constraints or veto players) and transnational (e.g., globaliza-
tion) social pressures. The analytical approach enabled us to understand how 
material and ideational factors as well as internal and external conditions influ-
ence the securitization choices and negotiation behaviour of state actors. 
The analysis showed that important changes in the South Asian security complex 
paved the way for Vajpayee’s peace initiative and the onset of the bilateral compos-
ite dialogue. First, India renounced its partially imperialistic policies towards its 
neighbours and began to pursue a more cooperative and integrative regional policy. 
Thereafter, economic issues moved to the centre of Indian foreign policy, which 
began to be characterized by a greater awareness for interdependence and the impor-
tance of a stable regional environment for India’s socio-economic development. 
Second, political and economic crisis and the increasing power of Islamist funda-
mentalists weakened Islamabad’s room for manoeuvre but also led to a shift in 
Pakistan’s threat perceptions. Third, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had far-reaching con-
sequences for the region and improved India’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Pakistan. 
Fourth, external powers now perceive India as a rising great power and have thus 
changed their policies towards India. Fifth, the external support of Pakistan has 
declined, thereby making it more difficult for the country to maintain the regional 
balance of power or opt for a military solution to the Indo-Pak conflict.
However, there remain major obstacles to a sustainable peace process and the 
resumption of the bilateral composite dialogue: the state-dominating role of the 
military in Pakistan, conflicting national identities between India and Pakistan, and 
contested statehood in Pakistan linked to the growing power of Islamic fundamen-
talists. As long as the Pakistani military (or some influential elements within it) 
continue to actively support and tolerate Islamic fundamentalists, dominate the 
Pakistani state and perceive India as an adversary, it will set clear limits to every 
dialogue process. Likewise, the conflicting national identities will continue to 
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 constrain a normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. Combined with 
the still partially incomplete state-building processes and various extremist group-
ings in both countries, this adds a crucial internal dimension to the interstate conflict 
by generating the mutual belief that their own model of state is not recognized by the 
other side and the mutual fear that the other side wants to weaken or disrupt it. While 
India’s state-building process has been more successful, Pakistan is still a fragile and 
crisis-ridden state. This also could impair the potential resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute, because the Kashmir dispute mutually affirms India’s and Pakistan’s 
national identity; hence, abandoning the territorial claim would be seen as a confes-
sion that their nation-building process has failed, thereby fuelling the resistance and 
militancy of separatist and other extremist forces in both countries.
With regard to the future prospects for the India–Pakistan peace process, the ana-
lytical framework applied in this article suggests that the relations between both 
countries will be characterized by a complex interplay of internal and external fac-
tors. While the relations between both countries have reached a higher degree of 
stability in the recent decade, a full normalization of relations and conflict resolution 
seems rather unlikely within the next few years. Domestically, Pakistan’s recent 
democratic transition could in the long run pave the way for conflict resolution, but 
for the time being the civilian leaders are confronted with various domestic chal-
lenges and have arguably no political power base for pursuing peace with India. 
Likewise, there are still quite strong domestic constraints for a peace process in India. 
However, the overall decline of India’s internal wars and insurgencies in recent years 
could, if this trend continues, lead to a shift in India’s Pakistan policy and a more 
conciliatory stance. Externally, the relationship of both countries with the United 
States and China will crucially shape the peace process. In particular, the future allo-
cation of foreign assistance for Pakistan and growing international pressure to tackle 
Islamist militancy are of importance. At the same time, the analysis has shown that 
favourable structural conditions alone are insufficient for a successful peace process; 
it also requires skilled political leaders who are willing to overcome prevailing pat-
terns of thought and have the political power base to make bold decisions.  
Notes
 1. Though the bilateral composite dialogue has received attention in the literature (see 
Betz, 2007; Hussain, 2006; Misra, 2007; Padder, 2012; Patil, 2008), the existing studies 
do not provide a systematic, theoretically grounded account of the dialogue process.
 2. It is assumed in the United States and in India that the Pakistani ISI was involved in the 
attack (Curtis, 2012, p. 264).
 3. Interview of the author with a representative of the Ministry of External Affairs, New 
Delhi, 17 December 2013.
 4. See, for instance, the Annual Reports of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs or Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh’s speeches on internal security issues (2006, 2009, 2013a). 
 5. This can also partially be attributed to the resistance against the peace initiative within 
the BJP and any concessions with regard to the Kashmir dispute (ICG, 2012, p. 15; 
Wheeler, 2010, pp. 330–331). 
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 6. There are, however, also several Islamist terrorist groups in India acting independently 
of Pakistan (Thakur, 2011, p. 198). 
 7. This notion still holds true for parts of the Pakistani elite despite the fact that, with the 
secession of East Pakistan (today, Bangladesh), Pakistan is not any longer the single 
Muslim state in South Asia. The secession of Bangladesh is primarily seen as a result 
of the destructive influence of India (Cohen, 2013, p. 175).
 8. An indicator for Sharif’s attempt to repel the army’s role in Pakistani politics is that 
his government—despite the resistance of the army—wants to push through the legal 
process against Musharraf.
 9. The stabilizing effect of clear power imbalances is stressed by the power transition 
theory. See Tammen et al. (2000) and Lemke (2002).
10. The role of the United States is discussed in the next section.
11. For instance, India’s maritime strategy states that the Indian Navy should ‘provide 
insulation from external interference’ in the Indian Ocean (Ministry of Defence, 2007, 
p. iii). Similarly, the former foreign and defence minister Pranab Mukherjee (2005) 
noted: ‘[O]ur strategic location astride the major sea lanes of communication in the 
Indian Ocean makes us a dominant maritime player in this region’.
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